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NOTES
INCOME TAX-THREE-PARTY SALE-LEASEBAcKs-True Leases or
Financing Techniques? Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S.
561 (1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

A sale-leaseback, in its simplest form, involves an owner of

property! selling that property outright and simultaneously leasing
it back from the purchaser,2 frequently with renewal or repurchase
provisions. 3 The term, however, has become a catch-all description
for numerous transactions entered into for various reasons. Many of
these transactions are far more complex than the simple two-party
sale-leaseback. 4 In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 5 the com
plexities included the involvement of three parties and the in
tertwining of numerous terms and conditions. 6 When the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari,7 it appeared ready to an
1. Sale-leasebacks are most commonly used with real property involving large
amounts of money. Historically, however, the transaction developed as a method for
acquiring industrial equipment. See Olsen & Wisniewski, Leasing: The Current Tax
Picture in Rental of Industrial Facilities and Equipment, 29 J. TAX. 12 (1968);
Robertson, Leasing Arrangements from the Investor's Viewpoint, 46 TAXES 787
(1968); Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 21 MAJOR TAX PLAN.
621 (1969).
2. The purchaser-lessor can be a single investor or a syndicate of investors.
These realty syndicates may take the form of corporations, unincorporated associa
tions, limited partnerships, or trusts. See Rabinowitz, Realty Syndication: An Income
Tax Primer for Investor and Promoter, 29 J. TAX. 92 (1968); Robertson, supra note 1.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, has affected
these shelters. Besides limiting the availability of tax shelter techniques, the Act has
affected depreciation deductions through recapture provisions and interest deduc
tions by restricting the deductability of prepaid interest. For a complete analysis of
the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 on real estate tax shelters, see Dailey &
Gaffney, Anatomy of a Real Estate Tax Shelter: The Tax Reform Scalpel, 55 TAXES
127 (1977). For simplicity, this article will limit its analysis to the single investor.
3. See generally Cary, Corporate Financing through the Sale-Leaseback of
Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1948); Wil
son, Sales and Leasebacks, 16 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 149 (1964).
4. See Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transaction of Real Property-A Proposal, 30
TAX LAW. 701 (1977).
5. \ 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
6. See notes 10-16 infra and accompanying text.
7. 429 U.S. 1089 (1977). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve an
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nounce comprehensive, workable guidelines to facilitate tax plan
ning for sale-Ieasebacks. Instead, the Court has handed down a
multi-faceted opinion upholding the particular sale-leaseback in
question, but rendering the future treatment of these transactions
unpredictable.
The following discussion describes the relative position of the
Lyon transaction in the broad spectrum of sale-Ieasebacks. It exam
ines the conceptual difficulties which have hindered earlier attempts
to establish guidelines for the tax treatment of sale-lease backs,
questions the Supreme Court's analysis of the transaction, and
suggests future effects of Lyon on these transactions.
II.

THE LYON CASE

In April 1965, the Worthen Bank and Trust Company
(Worthen) planned construction of a multi-story banking and office
facility to serve as its headquarters. Various state and federal regu
lations prohibited conventional financing. s Worthen therefore en
tered into a sale-leaseback arrangement with the Frank Lyon Com
pany (Lyon),9 the taxpayer, who took title to the facility and leased
indicated conflict with American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th
Cir. 1974). This case involved a sale-leaseback transaction similar to the Lyon trans
action except that the building in question was a complete income-producing prop
erty at the time the parties entered into the transaction. Unlike the Eighth Circuit in
the Lyon case, however, the Court allowed the lessor to take the desired depreciation
deductions on the facility.
From this stated purpose of the Court, one could be assured that the conflict
would be resolved through the establishment of uniform guidelines or at least an
uniform analysis. Failure of the Court in this respect has left open the possibility of
similar conflicts in the future. Businessmen and tax planners alike face the possibil
ity of their transactions being struck down by a lower court after the transactions
have taken effect.
8. 435 U.S. at 563-64. Worthen originally desired to finance, build, and itself
own the proposed facility by selling debentures and acquiring the capital stock of a
wholly owned subsidiary which, upon receipt of the title to the facility, would raise
the remaining funds by a conventional mortgage. Arkansas banking laws imposed a
ceiling on interest-payable debentures rendering the debentures unattractive in the
then existing financial market. Additionally, since the proposed investment in the
banking facility was in excess of 40% of Worthen's capital stock and surplus, the
Arkansas State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System refused to ratify
the plan as required by 12 U.S.C. § 371d (1976), Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. §
265.2(f)(7) (1978), and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-547.1 (Supp. 1977).
9. Worthen negotiated with several interested investors, including Lyon. Lyon
was a closely held corporation engaged in the distribution of electrical products.
Worthen selected Lyon as the investor because of its acceptance of Worthen's coun
terproposal which incorporated the best features of the proposed offers. 435 U.S. at
565.
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it back to the bank for its long term use. to As the investor, Lyon

Frank Lyon, chairman of the board of the taxpayer company, served on Worth
en's board and had substantial business relations with Worthen. Normally, such a
relationship would indicate a sham transaction. However, the Court's doubts as to
the parties' intent to deal at arm's length were discharged by the uniqueness of the
transaction to Worthen, and the fact that Worthen opened the negotiations to any
interested investor. See id. at 581-82.
10. The transfer of title and leaseback involved a ground lease, a sales agree
ment, and a building lease. Worthen as the owner of the site, leased the site to Lyon
for a period of 76 years and 7 months. The first 19 months equaled the estimated
construction period of the facility. The first 26 years and 7 months, excluding the
construction period, constituted the period of the mortgage. During that period the
rents amounted to only $50 per year. The parties favored the minimal ground rents,
since increased ground rents would require an equal increase in building rents paid
by Worthen, resulting in a wash item. Beyond the initial rental period, however, the
rents sharply increased, ranging from $100,000 to $250,000 per year over the next 50
years. ld. at 565.
Under the sales agreement, Worthen agreed to sell the building to Lyon piece
by piece as it was constructed for a total price not to exceed $7,640,000. This proce
dure allowed both parties to retain a substantial sales tax saving since by Arkansas
law, purchases of material by a national bank were exempt from the state sales tax.
Also, the piecemeal sales of the building constituted sales of real estate and were
exempt from the sales tax. See id. at 566 n.2. Since the piecemeal sale of the build
ing has no effect on the federal tax treatment of the parties, this article treats the
transaction as requiring the sale of the completed facility.
The building lease constituted a net lease which, by definition, imposes upon
Worthen as a lessee the responsibilities for all the expenses, risks, and liabilities
associated with the facility, excluding wear and tear. [d. at 567. A summary of the
lease terms may be found in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749-50
(8th Cir. 1976). Worthen also had an option to repurchase at various times at stated
prices or to renew the lease up to eight additional terms at five-year intervals. 435
U.S. at 566-67.
The combination of the ground lease and the building lease created a time gap
during which Lyon would be without Worthen as a tenant, but would still be leasing
the site of the facility from Worthen under the terms of the ground lease. This "shirt
tail" period could, depending upon Worthen's exercise of its five-year renewal op
tions, extend from a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of 50 years. [75-year ground
lease-{25-year primary ternl of lease + total renewal period opted by Worthen) =
the "shirt tail" period]. During this period, Lyon still had to satisfy the rental obliga
tions to Worthen on the ground lease. Lyon could offset the ground rent only by
acquiring a lessee willing to pay sufficient rents to defray ownership expenses as
well as ground rent. Thus, if Worthen refused to renew or purchase and Lyon failed
to secure another lessee, Lyon would bear the risk of being left with an empty,
non-income-producing facility.
The agreements left unclear who owned the facility upon the expiration of the
ground lease. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the retention of
the land reserved to Worthen "substantial control over the ultimate disposition of the
building should the bank forgo its option privileges." See 536 F.2d at 752-53 n.6. If
Lyon retained control at the end of the ground lease period, it would have to either
sell the building to Worthen, renegotiate a building lease with Worthen, purchase
the site, or renegotiate the ground lease. Otherwise, Lyon would not be able to use
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supplied an out-of-pocket at-risk investment of $500,000. 11 This in
vestment could return up to 6% per year, depending upon Worth
en's exercise of the lease renewal and repurchase options. 12
Worthen obtained for Lyon interim construction financing from the
First National City Bank of New York (Citibank).13 After approving
Lyon as the investor, New York Life Insurance Company (New
York Life) provided permanent long-term financing for the proj
ect.14 Upon completion of the facility, Lyon used the New York
Life funds to discharge the interim construction loan from Citibank,
thus eliminating Citibank from the transaction. 15
The series of complementary and interlocking agreements
among the parties obligated Worthen to pay rent equal to the prin
cipal and interest payments of Lyon's mortgage. Worthen also pos
sessed an option to repurchase the facility at stipulated times with
stated prices equal to the then unpaid balance of Lyon's mort
gage plus the initial $500,000 equity with 6% return. 16 In 19~9, the
the building without trespassing on Worthen's property. The Supreme Court, how
ever, failed to comment on the issue, concentrating on the aspects of the transaction
within the ground lease period.
11. The total purchase price of the facility amounted to $7,640,000. Since New
York Life Insurance Company had agreed to permanent financing of $7,140,000,
Lyon was required by the terms of the agreement to supply the difference of
$500,000 as equity. During negotiations, Worthen had proposed that the investor
selected for the transaction supply the equity. See note 9 supra and accompanying
text. Lyon agreed to the counterproposal and supplied the necessary funds required
by Worthen to complete the financing of the new building. See also Rosenburg &
Weinstein, Sales-Leasebacks: An Analysis of these Transactions after the Lyon Deci
sion, 45 J. TAX. 146 (1976).
12. Over the primary 25-year term, Worthen had the option to buy the facility
at specific times and prices. In addition to including the unpaid balance of the un
derlying building mortgage, each repurchase figure included the $500,000 personal
investment plus 6% return. 435 U.S. at 567.
13. [d.
14. New York Life agreed to purchase Lyon's $7,140,0006%% 25-year secured
note which was issued upon completion of the building. The mortgage was secured
by a first deed of trust executed by the taxpayer and Worthen, which conveyed to
New York Life title to the land and facility. As additional security, Lyon assigned its
interest in the building lease and ground lease to New York Life. In a separate
agreement with New York Life, Worthen consented to the assignment and agreed not
to terminate the lease during the 25-year period of the mortgage. 435 U.S. at 567-68.
See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1976).
15. 435 U.S. at 568.
16. Total rent for the building over the primary term of the lease was
$14,989,767.24, which equaled the principal and interest that would amortize the
$7,140,000 mortgage loan to Lyon for the same period. The lease terms included
options to repurchase the building at the end of 11, 15, 20, and 25 years at prices
equal to Lyon's investment of $500,000 at 6% return plus the sum of the unpaid
balance of the New York Life mortgage. [d. at 566-67.
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year the building was completed, rent began to accrue to Lyon
from Worthen. While Lyon included the rent as income,17 it also
claimed deductions for depreciation 18 on the Worthen building, for
interest paid on the interim and permanent mortgage loans,19 and
for other expenses incurred in the construction of the building. 20
The full tax benefits of ownership therefore accrued to Lyon as a
result of a relatively small out-of-pocket investment.
On audit of Lyon's 1969 return,21 the Commissioner of Inter
nal Revenue disallowed the deductions, asserting that as a matter
of economic substance for federal tax purposes, Worthen retained
the real ownership in the building. 22 The Commissioner assessed a
deficiency on Lyon's federal income tax,23 which Lyon paid. Upon
denial of its claim for a refund, Lyon initiated suit in federal dis-

At the end of the primary term, if Worthen desired to renew the lease, the rents
were reduced by approximately 50% to $300,000 per year. These rents were propor
tionately washed by the ground rents due from Lyon. Lyon's recoupment of its in
vestment, however, rested on its ability to rent the facility for the "shirt tail" period.
See note 10 supra and accompanying text. If Lyon failed to realize sufficient rental
during the period, the investment return would fall proportionately. See Zarrow &
Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision in Lyon Lists Multiple Criteria,
49 J. TAX. 42 (1978).
17. I.R.C. § 61.
18. Id. § 167.
19. Id. § 163.
20. 435 U.S. at 568.
21. Worthen moved into the facility on December 1, 1969.
22. The gist of the Commissioner's argument was that the sale-leaseback in
question constituted a financing transaction in which Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000
and acted as a conduit for the transmission of principal and interest from Worthen to
New York Life. Id. at 569.
23. If the transaction constituted a financing technique which lacked substance,
the rent would not be included in Lyon's gross income, nor would the deductions
related to the facility be allowed. On Lyon's return, however, because the deduc
tions exceeded Lyon's rental income reported, the Service increased Lyon's reported
income by $497,219.18. This created a tax deficiency of $236,596.36 which together
with interest of $43,790.84 resulted in an assessment of $280,387.20 for the year of
1969. Id.
Most of this assessment resulted from expenses accrued during the construction
of the facility, amounting to $451,666.75. The deductions which are important here
are the depreciation deduction of $51,618.79 and the interest deduction from the
mortgage of $40,162.50 taken by Lyon for December 1969. These deductions surpass
ed the rental income for the same period of $48,527.01, thus creating a tax loss. If the
Commissioner had allowed the deductions, Lyon would have received favorable tax
treatment. The deductions would have offset reported income unrelated to the sale
leaseback transaction to the extent of the tax loss. For an analysis of the tax savings,
see Gallagher, Tax Consequences of a Leveraged Lease Transaction, 52 TAXES 356
(1974); Robertson, supra note 1. But see 435 U.S. at 580 n.15.
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trict court.24 In a memorandum opinion the court ruled that the
claimed deductions were allowable. 25 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed,26 holding that the burdens, benefits, and
risks which Lyon had incurred were too insubstantial to establish
ownership status for tax purposes. 27 After granting certiorari,28 the
Supreme Court reversed,29 holding that Lyon retained significant
and genuine attributes of a lessor which gave Lyon a depreciable
interest in the facility.
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Because the repurchase options and lease renewals permitted
Lyon to recover its $500,000 investment with up to 6% return, the
Service argued that the transaction represented a financing scheme
without sufficient economic substance to constitute a depreciable
interest in the facility. The Service claimed as controlling prece
dent an earlier Supreme Court case, Helvering v. F & R Lazarus
and CO.30 In Lazarus the taxpayer had transferred properties to a
24. Suit arose in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas.
25. The court concluded that the intention of the parties as evidenced by their
written agreements, read in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances at
the time of the agreement, was to create a sale-leaseback with the option to repur
chase. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 75-2 US TC (CCH) ~ 9545 (1975); Frank Lyon
Co. v. United States, 36 FED. TAXES 2d (P-H) ~ 5059 (E.D. Ark. 1975). See also 435
U.S. at 569.
26. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
27. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit based its inquiry on whether
the final business bargain allowed Lyon, as a lessor, to retain sufficient interests in
the property consistent with a lessor-lessee relationship. This was not determined by
the intent of the parties, but rather by the allocation of the interests between the
parties as defined by the written documents. After examining the various interests
allocated by the documents, the court concluded that the features of the lease
cumulatively deprived Lyon of a depreciable interest. For the purpose of taxation,
Lyon's ownership interest in the facility was too insignificant to allow him the bene
fits of depreciation deductions. See also notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 30-47 infra and accompanying text.
30. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
In Lazarus, the taxpayer transferred properties to a trust, and then leased them
from the trust for 99 years with repurchase options at stated scheduled prices. The
taxpayer as lessee sought the depreciation deductions by arguing that the transaction
was in reality.a mortgage to secure a loan and, therefore, retained the right to take
the deductions. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the grounds that
the right to take depreciation followed legal title. Completely disregarding the lessor
as the owner, the Court permitted the deductions by treating the transaction as a
financing transaction.
The taxpayer-lessor in Lyon, however, had title to the depreciable facility and
argued that it possessed sufficient incidents of ownership in the building to render
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trust and released them, a situation unlike the Lyon sale-leaseback
which involved an independent third party, the mortgagee. 31 The
Court held that this distinction, as well as the unavailability of the
simpler two-party arrangement by virtue of the state and federal
banking restrictions,32 removes Lyon from the controlling authority
of Lazarus. 33 Lazarus would apply only if Worthen had been able
to directly secure the mortgage agreement with New York Life and
to receive the $500,000 loan from Lyon. 34
The majority's inquiry into the Worthen-Lyon transaction
focused on whether the substance35 of the entire transaction
amounted to an "elaborate financing scheme" or a bona-fide trans
fer of title sufficient to give the taxpayer-lessor a depreciable inter
est in the building. 36 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
after stressing that "no simple device [was] available to peel away
the form of this transaction and to reveal its substance,"37 em
phasized that the agreements in their final forms imposed primary
liability on Lyon. 3s Various contingencies surrounding Worthen's
him the owner for tax purposes. The Commissioner, contrasting his position in
Lazarus, claimed that the transactions were only a financing technique with Lyon
being a mere conduit to forward mortgage payments to the mortgagee, New York
Life. See 435 U.S. at 574-75.
31. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
32. 435 U.S. at 575. See also note 8 supra and accompanying text.
33. It should be noted that Lazarus still stands as controlling precedent in sim
pler two-party transactions. The transaction need only possess the necessary eco
nomic substance to render the lessor the owner for tax purposes.
34. 435 U.S. at 575-76.
35. The Court's analysis rests on the established principle that the "objective
economic realities" of a transaction rather than its particular form govern for tax pur
poses. The Court noted, " 'In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the
courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are
not rigidly binding.' " ld. at 573 (quoting Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308
U.S. 252, 255 (1939)). If a genuine multiparty transaction exists, the fact that it consti
tutes a sale-leaseback will not operate in itself to deny proper tax benefits for the
taxpayer. S'ee id. at 584 n.19.
36. ld. at 573.
37. ld. at 576.
38. Id. at 576-77. Justice Blackmun explained that the effect of this liability on
Lyon was not just the abstract possibility of an extraordinary circumstance occurring
as to prevent Worthen from making its rental payments. The realities of the situation
placed the liability on Lyon's shoulders "for all the world to see," while Lyon as a
continual enterprise "exposed its very business well-being to this real and substan
tial risk." I d. at 577.
Lyon did not exist as a corporation established by Worthen or even financed to
any degree by Worthen, but prevailed as an independently owned business entity
interested in investment of its funds. The transaction thus appeared to be conducted
at arm's length. See note 9 supra and accompanying test.
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exercise of its options to repurchase or renew made Lyon's recov
ery of its investment with a guaranteed return highly improbable. 39
Additionally, state and federal banking statutes had barred
Worthen from entering into the specific two-party financing agree
ment which the Service urged to be the true substance of the
transaction. 4o To the Court, these factors indicated a transaction
which possessed far more substance than a mere mortgage agree
ment between Worthen and Lyon and a loan from Lyon to
Worthen.
The Court, however, acknowledged that favorable tax consid
erations, measured by the benefits of the depreciation deductions
on the facility, 41 influenced Lyon's decision to participate in the
transaction. 42 Significant tax motivations and the acceptance of a
lower economic return because of tax benefits did not nullify the
form of the transaction where the transaction itself possessed sig
nificant economic substance. 43 Lyon conceded a lower rate of re
turn on its investment44 in order to obtain the anticipated benefit
of depreciation deductions. To disallow the tax benefits simply be
cause the otherwise legitimate business transaction rested on such
tax advantages, would destroy the business purposes of the transac
tion. 45 As long as Lyon possessed a sufficient depreciable interest
39. The rents due at the end of the primary term of the lease after the mortgage
has been paid fall short of the promised 6% return which, as the Service urges, Lyon
is guaranteed. The assured return only exists if Worthen exercises its options to pur
chase. Whether Worthen will exercise any of its options totally depends on the ex
ternal contingencies of the value of real estate, the cost of money, and Worthen's
capital structure at the time the options are exercisable. Thus, because of the contin
gent nature of the options and the lack of any economic compulsion on the part of
Worthen to exercise any of the options, the return of the investment with guaranteed
interest cannot be considered in determining Lyon's depreciable interest. 435 U.S. at
579-80.
40. Id. See also note 8 supra and accompanying text.
41. 435 U.S. at 580. For an analysis of those favorable tax benefits akin to this
type of sale-leaseback, see notes 71-73 infra.
42. 435 U.S. at 580 (citing Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 503, 579-80 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
43. Kaster, Another View of the Implications of the Supreme Court Decision In
Lyon, 49 J. TAX. 44 (1978).
44. Lyon accrued no net profit from the rents since the rents equaled the
amount due on the amortized loan from New York Life. To Lyon, the zero cash flow
to him could be justified only by the tax benefits from the transaction. Without the tax
benefits, Lyon's pu~ose for entering the transaction would be senseless, since his
expected return would no longer exist.
45. Generally, tax avoidance lacks relevance in determining the allowance of
those contemplated tax benefits. See 435 U.S. at 575 (quoting Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960)). But, where the transaction incorporates tax
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in the property, the Court found that the Service could not disal
low the deductions.
The nature of the Worthen-Lyon transaction indicated that
there existed no simple owner of the building. Justice Blackmun
nevertheless determined that Lyon committed its capital to the
building. Therefore, Lyon was permitted to claim both deprecia
tion deductions for the consumption of that capital and interest de
ductions on the obligations stemming from the facility. Finally,
after an analysis of the substance and economic realities of the
transaction, as well as the status of all the parties,46 the Court held
that since Lyon as the lessor retained "significant and genuine at
tributes of the traditional lessor status," the Commissioner was
compelled to honor the form adopted by the parties. 47
In his dissent, Justice Stevens disputed the relevance of the
factors relied on by the majority to establish Lyon's depreciable
interest. Stevens contended that the existence of a true lessor
lessee relationship depended on the present value of the lessor's
reversionary estate to the lessor. 48 The lessor, through his remain
ing interests upon the initiation of the lease, must participate in
the risks and benefits of property ownership to render his interest
in the property depreciable. 49 In the Worthen-Lyon transaction,
benefits without the presence of a distinct business purpose beyond those benefits,
the transaction assumes a sham characteristic. The tax benefits may be a motivating
factor for one to become a party to a transaction, but those tax benefits cannot be the
dominating reason for the transaction. Otherwise, the "business purpose doctrine"
will require that the tax benefits be disallowed. See Knetsch v. United States, 364
U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), afJ'd, 44
T.C. 284 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). See also Young, The Role of
Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAX LAW. 275, 277-86 (1969).
In Lyon, the Court failed to address the issue of a business purpose. The Court
did recognize, however, that Lyon's principal motivation was diversification. See 435
U.S. at 582. The presence of this fact thus eliminated the necessity for the Court to
deal with the issue.
46. Id. at 581-83.
47. Justice Blackmun stated as his holding,
[Wlhere, as here, there is a genuine multi-party· transaction with economic
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory re
alities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped
solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the
Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by
the parties.
Id. at 583-84.
48. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This interest consisted of the power of
the lessor to assume complete control over the facility upon expiration of the lessee's
leasehold interest.
49. Id.
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the repurchase options, if exercised, guaranteed Lyon his equity
investment with 6% return plus the balance of the New York Life
mortgage. 50 Yet, the value of Lyon's reversionary interest might
fluctuate in relation to the fair market value of the building. But,
because of the return, Lyon's position upon exercise of the options
would be no better or worse than at the outset of the transaction.
On the other hand, Worthen's tender, upon repurchase, of the
remaining rental payments plus Lyon's investment equity with ac
crued return would, in reality, permit it to receive the entire
interest in the facility without payment to Lyon for its reversionary
interest. This power in Worthen attaches a zero value 51 to Lyon's
reversion over the primary term of the lease. The existence of the
zero value interest, according to Justice Stevens, prohibited Lyon
from participating in the risks and benefits of ownership and thus
from being characterized as the owner of the facility. 52
Justice Stevens' argument relies on the exercise of a power of
the lessee, even though at the time of the agreement's formulation
the exercise of that power remains uncertain. Worthen was under
no economic compulsion to exercise any of the four repurchase op
tions. 53 Similarly, although exercise was completely controlled by
Worthen's discretion, the various contingencies 54 surrounding
the exercise of the repurchase options made such an event improb
able at the outset of the lease term. Until such exercise became
probable, a sufficient lessor-lessee relationship existed55 to give
50. See note 12 supra.
51. 435 U.S. at 585-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If Worthen should exercise its
option to repurchase in the lIth year, Lyon would receive merely the remainder of
the mortgage loan to Lyon from New York Life plus the initial $500,000 equity with
6% return. See note 12 supra. At that point, Lyon would relinquish its rights over the
remaining rental period and its reversionary interest for a figure equal only to the
total rent due on the remaining rental period plus the investment with interest. Since
no portion of the option price is attributed to the lessor's reversion, the interest is
said to have zero-value.
52. 435 U.S. at 586 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If Worthen makes a commitment not to exercise the option, at that point, circum
stances may change Significantly to recognize Lyon as the owner. Until such an
event occurs, Justice Stevens would treat Worthen as the owner of the entire facility,
since Worthen has an unrestricted cost-free power to exercise an option to purchase
for the primary 25-year term.
53. ld. at 587 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See note 39 supra.
55. Justice Stevens stated,
[Lyon] assumed the risk that Worthen might not exercise its option to pur
chase at or before the end of the original 25-year term. If Worthen should
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Lyon a depreciable interest in the facility. 56 To bar depreciation
deductions because of these options would impose an injustice on
Lyon who otherwise would have had a depreciable interest in the
facility.
Justice White also filed a dissent57 and agreed with the anal
ysis of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which had exam
ined the issue of ownership through the acmal allocation of inter
ests made by the parties. 58 Since Lyon would be guaranteed a re
turn on his investment with interest throughout the maximum
period of the transaction, Lyon incurred insignificant benefits,
risks, and burdens to substantiate its claim as owner of the building
for tax purposes. 59 This analysis differs from that of Justice Stevens
who conceded that Lyon could become the owner upon Worthen's
sacrifice, during the course of the lease, of its cost-free power to
exercise its options. 6o In the view of Justice White and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, Lyon could become
the owner only after the facility reverted back to Lyon upon termi
nation of the lease.
Both dissenting Justices based their conclusions on the effects
of the option terms and both assumed that Worthen at some time
would exercise one of the options. 61 The opinions ignored the key
fact that "simply too many contingencies, including variations in
value of real estate, in the cost of money, and in the capital struc
ture of Worthen,"62 existed to automatically assume that Worthen
would not "walk away" from the relationship at the end of the pri
exercise that right not to repay, perhaps it would then be appropriate to
characterize petitioner as the owner and Worthen as the lessee.
435 u.s. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By this statement, Stevens rests his conclu
sion of no depreciable interest in Lyon on the nature of the repurchase options.
Without these options, Lyon will possess the proper interest for tax purposes.
56. See notes 98-101 infra and accompanying text.
57. Justice White filed a dissent, but did not write an opinion.
58. The Eighth Circuit analogized the interests held by the parties to a "bundle
of sticks," in which each stick represented an interest in the underlying property.
For sufficient ownership interest for tax purposes, the taxpayer must have possessed
sufficient genuine interests in its bundle. The Eighth Circuit, however, after examin
ing the various interests allocated by the documents, concluded that Worthen clearly
possessed every meaningful interest, and that in reality, Lyon "toted an empty bun
dle." See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1976).
59. But see note 39 supra.
60. 435 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also note 52 supra.
61. Worthen was not economically compelled to renew or repurchase. See notes
94-96 infra.
62. 435 U.S. at 579.
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mary rental period. The result, according to the majority, was that
Lyon obligated its capital 63 toward the building, and therefore
could claim depreciation for the consumption of that capital.
Because of the complicated nature and the unique circum
stances of the transaction in Lyon, the effects of the Lyon decision
on future sale-leaseback arrangements is speculative. Since Lyon is
the first three-party sale-leaseback on which the Supreme Court
has ruled, tax planner and tax collector alike will seek to use
the decision to their advantage. Thus, framers of three-party sale
leasebacks must consider Lyon within the scope of existing law and
policies concerning these transactions. Failure to consider the im
pact of Lyon could completely frustrate the overall business objec
tives of the transaction, leaving the investor-lessor without the tax
benefits required for a profitable transaction.

IV.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE

WORTHEN-LYON TRANSACTION

The Worthen-Lyon transaction was a specialized form of sale
leaseback known as a finance lease. Under a finance lease, the les
sor provides an initial investment from out-of-pocket funds and
then finances the balance through a recourse mortgage loan. 64 The
third party mortgagee's interest in the transaction centers on its
recovery of the mortgage without interrupting the lease agreement
between the lessor and lessee. Since the lessor assigns its interest
in the lease to the mortgagee,65 the mortgagee is chiefly concerned
with the financial stability of the lessee. 66 As long as the lease re

63. Lyon's capital consisted of $500,000 out-of-pocket funds and borrowed
funds from the New York Life mortgage.
64. See Lefevre, The Tax Laws of Lease Transactions Revisited, 53 TAXES 764
( 1975).
The investor-lessor participates in the venture with a proportionally small out
of-pocket investment in the purchase. The rental payments which are usually as
signed to the mortgage guarantee enough income to the lessor for repayment of the
mortgage with interest. Also, the mortgagee's risk is reduced, not only by the as
signment of the lease, but by the recourse liability of the lessor if the lessee should
walk from the transaction.
65. In most financing leases, the rent covers the cost of the property, amortized
over a period of time equal to the amounts due on the mortgage. The lessor, at the
outset of the transaction, assigns its interest in the rents to the mortgagee, thus
guaranteeing the mortgagee that the rents will flow directly to it to amortize the
mortgage.
66. New York Life in the transaction constitutes such a third party. In accepting
the 25-year mortgage, New York Life expected its payment through the rents from
the Worthen-Lyon lease, since Lyon had assigned all interests in the lease to it.
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mains in effect, the lease assignment by the lessor will guarantee
repayment of the mortgagee's full expected return. If the lessee
should "walk" from the transaction, the lessor loses the guaranteed
source of funds intended by the parties to satisfy the mortgage.
The mortgagee, if the lessor cannot secure another lessee and lacks
the sufficient funds to satisfy the mortgage, may realize less than
the full expected return. 67 Because of the recourse nature of the
transaction, however, the full burden of repayment ultimately falls
on the investor-lessor. No matter how the transaction concludes,
the lessor must satisfy the mortgage or be subject to foreclosure. 68
Unlike the more simple two-party sale-leaseback, which de
veloped solely as a tax sheltering device,69 the finance lea~e
evolved as a financing technique to raise the capital necessary
for long-range equipment and facility purchases. 7o Yet, from the
investor-lessor's point of view, the primary appeal of the finance
lease is the various tax advantages it offers. 71 These tax considera
67. What the mortgagee recovers depends on the terms of the mortgage agree
ment. Because the mortgage is recourse, the lessor will be personally liable on the
mortgage. The lessor, however, may feel that default would be more practical than
being "stuck" with the building throughout the mortgage period. Besides being
without a tenant and a source of revenue, the lessor will incur the expenses as
sociated with ownership of such a building including maintenance, insurance, and
taxes, as well as the debt service on the mortgage. The lessor thus will default, re
sulting in an acceleration of the mortgage with penalties. The terms will guarantee
the mortgagee immediate recovery of the principal, but the penalty will not equal
the return rate if the transaction had continued for the full period. The mortgagee
will have the facility sold at a foreclosure sale with the lessor liable through a defi
ciency judgment for any amount remaining on the mortgage not realized from the
sale.
68. The Supreme Court considered Lyon's assumption of the risk in the in
vestment as a key factor in deciding in Lyon's favor. See 435 V.S. at 567-77. See also
notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text.
69. See generally Cary, supra note 3; Zeitlan, supra note 1.
70. Lefevre, supra note 64, at 764-65. A new financing industry has evolved in
leasing for major industries in need of new sources of capital over the last several
years; a phenomenon Lefevre attributes to sluggish new-issue securities markets and
increased interest rates. Citing the transportation and utility industries as examples,
Lefevre states that "scarcely a major capital project is undertaken without considera
tion of lease financing." [d. at 764.
71. See Young, supra note 3, at 290-94. See also Comment, Sale and Lease.back
Transactions, 52 N.Y.V.L. REV. 672 (1977). The tax advantages of the transaction
allow the buyer-lessor depreciation deductions under I.R.C. § 167, and in some situa
tions investment credit under I.R.C. § 38, which can be transferred to the lessee
under I.R.C. § 48. The seller-lessee receives rent deductions under I.R.C. § 162.
Business advantages for the buyer-lessor consist of a safe investment of its capital.
The seller-lessee has the advantages of raising capital for the full market value of the
property, still has use of the facility, and prevents any liability from being entered on
its books so as not to hinder future borrowing.
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tions, in the form of investment credit, accelerated depreciation,
and interest deductions, determine the investor's financing profit, 72
and create a leasing rate lower than the cost of borrowed funds. 73
The disallowance of the tax benefits increases the cost of leasing to
the lessee and reduces the lessor's return on its investment. This
destroys the original business objectives of the transaction. 74 Thus,
while the transaction is primarily a financing technique for the les
see, its structure requires significant tax benefits for the investor
lessor. Guidelines for the tax treatment of these arrangements are
needed to uphold the business purpose of the transaction desired
by the parties, while maintaining a form acceptable to the Service.
72. The investor seeks to recover from the transaction an amount greater than
the interest paid on the mortgage. This amount may be generated from the rents.
Where the lessor agrees to a zero cash flow-rental payments equal to the amortized
amount of the loan resulting in zero profits from that source of cash remaining with
the lessor-the tax beI!efits remain the only reliable source of gain to the investor
lessor.
73. These tax consequences effectively grant the lessor, as the investor, suffi
cient tax benefits that produce a lease rate lower than the costs of borrowed funds. In
the Worthen-Lyon transaction, the borrowed funds of $7,140,000 amortized at 6%%
over 25 years would equal $14,989,767.24, resulting in a financing cost to Lyon of
$7,849,767.24. The rents equaled the exact amount necessary to fully amortize the
New York Life note. Since Lyon's profit on the investment was not figured into the
rent, he possessed a zero cash flow. Yet, under I.R.C. § 61, the rental payments
would be included in Lyon's gross income each year.
The various tax benefits, however, offset the rental payments included in Lyon's
gross income. Under I.R.C. § 163(a), the interest cost would be deducted, leaving
$7,140,000 of rents which represented the principal of the loan to be offset by further
deductions. The investment credit allowed under I.R.C. § 38 would offset some of
that balance. In this case, however, the credit was retained by Worthen under I.R.C.
§ 48(d), leaving only the depreciation deductions to offset the balance of the rents.
Under Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1937), the portion of the property
financed by borrowed funds is depreciable even though the owner has a small per
centage of out-of-pocket funds invested in the project. Thus, as in Lyon, where the
facility's lifetime equals that of the loan period, the entire cost of the facility can be
deducted as depreciation during the repayment of the loan.
Under I.R.C. § 167, the depreciation may be accelerated, resulting in a deprecia
tion of the facility in Lyon during the first 11 years of the 25-year life of the facility.
Assuming that Lyon has sufficient income to be offset by the deductions beyond the
rentals received from Worthen, the after-tax benefit could total 1.5 million dollars.
See 435 U.S. at 572 n.lO. If Worthen exercises the lith-year repurchase option, Lyon
would receive the remaining balance plus his investment with interest, subject to
capital gains taxes on the sale. Also, even if Worthen leases for the full term of the
lease, Lyon will have benefited from the deferment of the tax liability which is in
essence a loan from the government. See also Gallagher, supra note 23; Lefevre,
supra note 64, at 772-73; Schmidt & Larsen, Leveraged Lease Arrangements: Tax
Factors that Contribute to their Attractiveness, 41 J. TAX. 210 (1974).
74. This is especially true in the Worthen-Lyon situation where Lyon opted for
a zero cash flow in expectation of the various tax benefits associated with the transac
tion.
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THE SEARCH FOR GUIDELINES

The Supreme Court's multi-faceted analysis failed to provide
sufficient guidelines necessary for competent tax and business
planning. 75 Instead, the Court offered a general holding that
whether "a genuine multiparty transaction with economic sub
stance" exists in a particular situation will depend on the facts of
the case. 76 The development of leasing as a financing technique
requires guidelines sufficient to guarantee that the lessor possesses
a depreciable interest in the property at the time the parties for
mulate the transaction. Otherwise, the transaction fails to accom
plish its ultimate goal of reduced financing costs to the lessee and
maximum investment return to the lessor. Since the opinion offers
little in terms of adequate guidelines, the pre-Lyon law and the
effects of the decision on it must be evaluated.
The present Internal Revenue Service guidelines do not pro
vide a concrete basis upon which to formulate future real estate
financing leases. In its first major ruling on leasing, Revenue Rul
ing 55-540,77 the Service listed a number of factors which it con
sidered evidence of a sale rather than a lease. These factors, how
ever, dealt with equipment leases and except in the most clear-cut
situations were too general to be of use to tax planners. 78
The period after these early rulings marked the debut of a
variation of the finance lease known as the leveraged lease. 79 The
leveraged lease is modeled after the finance lease except that the
75. See Zarrow & Gorden, supra note 16. The authors have concluded that the
case offers little guidance to the practitioner.
76. 435 U.S. at 583-84.
77. 1955-2 C.B. 39. For a list of factors, see 435 U.S. at 577 n.14. See also
Javaras & Nelson, The New Leveraged Lease Guidelines, 53 TAXES 388, 393-94
(1975).
78. Javaras & Nelson, supra note 77, at 393; Lefevre, supra note 64, at 765 n.2.
These authors cite other revenue rulings reinforcing the Service's position including
the following: Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 72-408, 1972-2 C.B. 86;
Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56; Rev. Rul. 57-371, 1957-1 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 55
542, 1955-2 C.B. 58; and Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19.
79. See Javaras & Nelson, supra note 77; Lefevre, supra note 64.
The leveraged lease typically involves the following: (1) A lessor who creates
leverage by committing his personal funds to the purchase price (usually 20%), bor
rows the remainder on a non-recourse basis, and then leases the property to another
party on a net lease basis for substantially the property's useful life; (2) a lender who
finances most of the purchase price on a non-recourse basis relying solely on the
leased property and the lease as security; and (3) a lessee who obligates itself to
rental payments sufficient to allow the lessor to recover its investment and to service
the debt, usually with a profit. See Mann & Schmidt, The New Leveraged Lease
Guidelines, 6 TAX ADVISOR 390 (1975).
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lessor retains part of the cost of the property by a non-recourse
loan secured solely by a mortgage on the property and a security
assignment of the lease. 8o In response to this development, the
Service issued Revenue Procedure 75-21,81 which announced spe
cific guidelines 82 for the circumstances under whi(!h it would issue
a ruling on a leveraged lease. In Lyon, however, the Court prop
erly observed in a footnote 83 that the Service's guidelines were not
definitive and that they offered little guidance in formulating real
estate lease transactions.
Since the criteria employed by the Service to evaluate real
estate leases remains speculative, the ultimate source of guidelines
continues to be the various lease characterization cases resolved
over the last three decades. 84 The courts, in ascertaining the eco
nomic substance of these transactions, have traditionally dealt first
with an examination of the business bargain formulated by the par
ties. The earlier lower court decisions focused on the legal effect of
the transaction intended by the parties; their allocation of interests,
as read in the light of the relevant facts and circumstances existing
at the time of the transaction. 85
The United States Supreme Court in Lyon concluded that the
80. Javaras & Nelson, supra note 77; Lefevre, supra note 64, at 773-76.
81. 1975-1 C.B. 715. This ruling has no effect on Lyon, since it was issued after
the transaction.
82. The guidelines in general include the following: (a) The lessor incurs and
maintains a minimal investment equaling 20% of the cost of the property; (b) the
lessee can purchase only at fair market value; (c) the lessee furnishes no part of the
cost of the property; (d) the lessee has not lent to the lessor or guaranteed any part of
his indebtedness; and (e) the lessor must expect a profit on the transaction other than
from the tax treatment benefits. See also 435 U.S. at 577 n.14.
83. ld. See also Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 147 n.1. The distinc
tion between real property and equipment leasing is that equipment will almost in
evitably diminish in value through wear and tear, resulting in little or no residual
value at the end of the lease. Realty, however, because of customary maintenance
and improvements, frequently maintains its value and often may increase in value
over the period of the lease.
After considering to some extent the complaints of the real estate industry, the
Service agreed not to consider the general application of Rev. Proc. 75-21 to real
property. See id. (citing a letter from John W. Holt, Director, Corporate Tax Division,
to the National Retail Merchants Association, May 28, 1975).
84. See Lefevre, supra note 64, at 772-73.
85. See generally Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959);
Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955); Benton v. Commissioner,
197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952). These early cases concentrated on the lease versus sale
issue and, in most cases, involved only two parties. The intent issue, however, has
been carried over into the three-party cases. See Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977).
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parties intended an allocation of interests associated with a sale
leaseback. 86 The Court, however, failed to analyze the legal signifi
cance of the intent of the parties in arriving at the interest allo
cations_ In cases where unambiguous and complete documents
clearly define the allocation of interests, the lower courts have fo
cused their analysis on the substance of the transaction in light of
its background at the time of the execution of the agreement. 87 In
this traditional approach, the parties' good-faith belief as to the
legal effects of the documents is irrelevant in ascertaining economic
substance. Where, however, the basic rights, duties, and economic
interests of the parties are disputed, and the documents are in
complete and ambiguous, the courts view the parties' subjective
intent as an indication of the true allocation of interests among the
parties. 88 The result of traditional judicial analysis is that the objec
tive interest allocation as expressed by the written documents es
tablishes the legal effect of the transaction, while the subjective
intent of the parties merely establishes the gist of otherwise vague
or incomplete agreements.
In Lyon the parties' subjective intent was irrelevant because
the documents clearly spelled out the terms of the transaction. 89
Tax planners, to assure that the desired interest allocation is pre
served, must draft documents which indisputably characterize the
allocation of interests intended by the parties. Otherwise, if the
allocation is vague, a court will employ the unexpressed subjective
intent of the parties as ascertained by the existing facts and circum
stances to reveal the substance of the transaction. Reliance on
86. 435 U.S. at 579.
87. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977). See also M & W
Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971); Western Contracting Co. v.
Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288
(9th Cir. 1956); Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir.
1956); Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Universal Drilling Co.
v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. La. 1976); Arkansas Bank and Trust Co. v.
United States, 224 F. Supp. 171 (W.O. Ark. 1963); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States,
209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
88. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1977). The result
is that the subjective intent of the parties becomes a consideration for the court only
in the interpretation of the agreement. Once the rights, duties, and economic inter
ests are determined, subjective intent becomes totally immaterial in the characteriza
tion of the transaction for tax purposes.
89. The Eighth Circuit dealt with the issue at length. It concluded that the
documents represented the true allocation of interests between the parties, so as to
render any inquiry into the parties' subjective intent irrelevant. See Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1976).
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the intent factor, which itself is a question of fact,90 is a risky
and unpredictable approach which the prudent tax planner should
avoid.
Rather than looking to subjective intent, the Lyon Court con
centrated on the primary task of determining the economic sub
stance of the transaction from the parties' objective intent as ex
pressed in written documents. 91 In this area, lower courts have
emphasized the acquisition of an "equity" in the property by the
lessee as a fundamental factor in determining the economic sub
stance of a sale-leaseback. 92 If the lessee acquires an equity during
the course of rental payments, it is deemed the owner of the prop
erty for tax purposes. 93 The parties' "objective intent" to acquire
ownership of the property determines the existence of the equity.
If the lessee acquires an option to purchase at substantially below
fair market value at the date of exercise,94 if he is economically
compelled to renew the lease or to purchase,95 or if he receives a
90. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977).
91. The economic factors which surround the transaction permit the allocation
of interests between the parties, allowing the substance of the transaction to be pin
pointed. The importance of this stage of analysis rests in the fact that if the cumula
tive effect of these factors deprives the lessor of significant ownership, the lessee will
be treated as the owner of the facility for tax purposes.
92. See Lefevre, supra note 64; Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 150.
Equity is defined as the lessee acquiring ownership of his leasehold through the
application of rental payments toward a future purchase price.
93. See generally M & W Gear Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir.
1971); Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959);
Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1955); Benton v. Commissioner,
197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Universal Drilling Co. v. United States, 412 F. Supp.
1231 (E.D. La. 1976); Arkansas Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp.
171 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga.
1962).
94. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1955) (real estate lease
with option to reacquire title at the end of a 68-year term for $10 not a lease for tax
purposes); LVT Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39 (1974) (option to purchase based
on expected fair market value of the property at exercise date ruled as a valid lease);
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), affd, 500 F.2d
1222 (9th Cir. 1974) (substantial options to purchase on equipment lease held valid).
It should be noted that not every lease that contains an option to purchase is
automatically disregarded for tax purposes. One who takes an option may do so with
the hope of exercising it, but not necessarily with the intent of creating an equity
interest during the lease term. See Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Com"1issioner, 232
F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956). The decision ultimately depends on the objective intent of
the parties, indicated by the economic factors of the case in the light of the facts and
circumstances existing at the time of the formation of the agreement. See Benton v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Commissioner, 209 F.
Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
95. Usually, the situation arises where the rents are high during the primary
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bargain renewal option,96 the lessee acquires for tax purposes an
equity interest in the property through his rental payments.
In Lyon, no such equity existed since there was no legal obli
gation between the parties representing an agreed return on the
investment. 97 In the finance lease situation,98 equity exists if the
rents indicate a fixed return on the owner's investment or if the
options when exercised are intended to provide that fixed return,
regardless of the appreciation or depreciation of the property. 99
Lyon would realize such a return if Worthen exercised one of the
repurchase or renewal options,lOO but the Court concluded that
this exercise could not be guaranteed with reasonable certainty.
Worthen could walk away from the transaction after the primary
lease expired, since it was not legally or economically compelled to
stay. 101
The lack of a guaranteed investment return for Lyon imposed
sufficient risks and benefits of ownership on Lyon. It is this owner
ship interest which determined that the transaction possessed suffi
cient economic substance for taxation purposes. The result, as the
Court concluded, was a sufficient depreciable interest attributed to
Lyon. Therefore, for a finance lease to be economically substantial,
the repurchase and renewal options must allow the lessor to par
ticipate in the risks and benefits normally associated with a depre
ciable interest.

tenn, or where the lessee has made improvements in the property, and the purchase
or renewal options are so low that the lessee becomes economically compelled to
exercise. Lefevre, supra note 64, at 767-70.
96. Compare Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) and
Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539 (D. Vt. 1964),
affd, 342 F.2d.994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965) with Lockhart Leasing
Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 301 (1970), affd, 446 F.2d 269 (10th CiT. 1971).
97. The government had contended that the $500,000 investment by Lyon con
stituted a loan at a guaranteed return of 6%. As later indicated by the Court, the rents
alone failed to provide this return, since the only way the return could be realized
was by the renewal or repurchase options being exercised by Worthen. See 435 U.S.
at 579.
98. In the earlier, simpler, two-party sale-leasebacks, the equity issue served to
expose the transaction as a sale. If the lessee as a result of the rental payments
acquires something of value in relation to the overall transaction beyond the mere
use of property, then he acquires equity. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying
text.
99. See Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977) (rents and
option privileges found to provide an equity by guaranteeing the investor a return on
funds invested).
100. See notes 10 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
101. 435 U.S. at 583.
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THE EFFECTS OF LYON

The Supreme Court in Lyon offered tax planners insufficient
guidelines to aid them in the planning of future finance leases. In
stead of attempting to synthesize the vast array of case law and
commentary, the opinion fuels the already raging dispute between
taxpayer and tax collector. The Court upheld the finance lease as
having the substance of a true sale-leaseback. It failed, however, to
provide taxpayers with the essential guidelines for the formulation
of individual finance leases.
The opinion does communicate pitfalls which must be avoided
in future transactions. The Court believes that ownership for tax
purposes requires a risk of loss and a possibility of a profit from an
investment in property.102 These ownership risks are not based on
calculated lease rates, since leases with zero cash return l03 are con
sidered valid and acceptable for tax purposes.104 The tax planner
may continue to employ the tax benefits to calculate investment
incentive and to compute the prOjected rate of return. 105 If, how
ever, the investment recovery is reasonably assured through the
reduction of risk by a guaranteed residual or fixed options, then the
transaction possesses insufficient economic substance for tax pur
poses. The transaction offers to the lessor no depreciable interest in
the property, resulting in a recharacterization of the transaction as
a loan. lOS But, if the transaction passes muster by actually placing
real and appropriate risks and benefits of ownership on the lessor,
then the government is bound to follow the form adopted by the
parties.
The Lyon decision may have a significant impact on leveraged
lease transactions. 107 In an earlier case before the Tax Court,
102. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Lefevre, supra note 64, at 774. The lelise rates are calculated to be
somewhat less than the interest rates on borrowed funds. The investors hope to prof
it from the residual and the tax benefits even to the point of accepting a lease which
produces only enough rent to service the debt, i.e., zero cash return.
104. Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 11. The absence of a cash flow should
not be significant, since it merely serves a function of the extent to which the owner
has borrowed to purchase the property. The critical ownership attribute is the rent
for the use of the property. If the lessee pays a fair rental value, then the fact that all
the rental is used by the lessor to service a debt should not effect ownership.
105. See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
107. Even though the Worthen-Lyon transaction was not a leveraged lease
transaction, the two are nevertheless akin to each other. The leveraged lease, how
ever, attempts to remove personal liability from the lessor for the financing if the
transaction should fall through during the lease period. See notes 64-68 supra and
accompanying text.
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David F. Bolger, 108 the court created a unique tax shelter by treat
ing a lessor of property acquired with no cash investment but with
large non-recourse financing as the owner of the property. This
enabled the taxpayer to offset excess earnings beyond rental pay
ments through large accelerated depreciation deductions with very
little personal investment. 109 Under this ruling, the taxpayer
achieves tax postponement through the depreciation deductions
and can still walk away from the building and the loans if the trans
action should collapse. The Tax Court, despite the lack of risk in the
investment, concluded that for tax purposes the amount of the in
vestment financed by the non-recourse mortgage constituted a de
preciable interest.
The Supreme Court in Lyon emphasized that Lyon's personal
liability on the mortgage notes was an important factor surrounding
the Worthen-Lyon transaction,uo The Court did not directly con
demn transactions in which the lessor's liability was substantially
non-recourse. But, by emphasizing Lyon's personal liability on the
mortgage note, the Court implied that in chameleon-like transac
tions where the investment is a non-recourse liability, that invest
ment, when considered in the light of other factorslll surrounding
the individual transaction, will indicate a debtor-creditor relation
ship between the parties. Since non-recourse financing shifts the
transaction toward a debtor-creditor relationship, other factors must
exist in the transaction to balance the lack of personal risk in the
financing. The crucial factor for the tax planner to consider would
be the avoidance of renewal and repurchase options which include
a guaranteed return. Even though the options would meet the
mandates of Lyon through uncertainty in the lessee's exercise and
the lack of economic compulsion on the lessee to exercise the
options, such a factor might be outweighed by the total lack of
personal risk in the financing by the investor-Iessor. 112 Since the
combination of these factors would undoubtedly produce a debtor
creditor relationship, the parties must choose between non
recourse financing and options which guarantee a return though
uncertain in their exercise. If the parties choose non-recourse
108. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
109. The Bolger procedure is explained in Comment, Tax Court Approves Two
Real Estate Tax Shelter Deals; Cases may be Appealed, 38 J. TAX. 263 (1973). For an
analysis of the effects of Bolger, see Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter That
Wore No Clothes, 28 TAX L. REV. 355 (1973).
110. 435 U.S. at 577.
111. For a list offactors, see id. at 582-83.
112. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.
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financing and base the options on fair market value without consid
eration of a guaranteed return in any form, any argument by the
Service based on Lyon that attacks the non-recourse financing
would be weakened by the lack of a guaranteed return. If both
non-recourse financing and guaranteed return are chosen, the Ser
vice can then forcefully argue that the non-recourse liability of the
lessor distinguishes that case from Lyon and therefore the trans
action possesses insufficient substance to constitute a depreciable
interest.
Planning sale-Ieasebacks seeks to assure that the transaction
results at its inception in an economically genuine lessor-lessee re
lationship that will permit the tax benefits to flow to the lessor
investor. Sufficient risks and benefits of ownership must remain
with the lessor during the entire course of the lease period.
Otherwise, the tax benefits will not accrue to the lessor, resulting
in the disruption of the business purposes for which he entered
into the transaction. 113
Many of the motivating factors surrounding the Lyon transac
tion may not exist in other finance leases. Among these are the
legal restraints preventing Worthen from building its own facility,
Worthen's possession of options by order of the banking regulators,
and the requirement by the federal banking regulators of owner
ship of the building by an independent third party.114 Yet, circum
stances in Lyon do exist which render the decision a useful tax
planning tool, despite the lack of specific guidelines within the deci
sion. The personal liability of the lessor,115 the lessee's repurchase
and renewal options which neither gave the lessee an increasing
equity116 nor guaranteed the lessor a recoupment of its invest
ment,117 and the independence of the investor-lessor from the les
see, all indicated a transaction with substantial economic substance.
Such factors exist in most of today's finance leases. Failure to exam
ine them in light of Lyon will result in the classification of the
transaction as a financing technique with little or no attributes of a
lease, and ultimately in the disallowance of the anticipated deduc
tions to the lessor.

Jerome]. Kavulich
113. See notes 64-74 supra and accompanying text.
114. See 435 U.S. at 582.
115. See id. at 577.
116. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 92-lOl supra and accompanying text.

